Closing Velocity

NPR On Missile Defense: Part 5 -- Political Future

The fifth and final installment (audio here) of National Public Radio's series on US missile defense was a dud. They once again trot out the critics from earlier installments as the cherry on top:

"Today we have a single kill vehicle on each one of our interceptors," [Missile Defense Agency Director] Obering says. "In the future, we will have many kill vehicles on one interceptor, and that will allow us to handle the more complex threats."

Critics of the Missile Defense Agency say the multiple kill vehicle is an admission that today's interceptors are not sophisticated enough to overcome decoys.

"The Missile Defense Agency knows that the current approach cannot be relied upon, and so they're developing this multiple kill vehicle, hoping that that will work," says Philip Coyle, an adviser at the Center for Defense Information. "The concept behind it is — it's sort of like a shotgun. Instead of having a single kill vehicle, you have half a dozen or perhaps more. The problem with the development is that each one needs propulsion systems so that it can turn and steer. All of this takes weight. It's hard to get many of them on the interceptor."

You know what else is "hard," Coyle? Hitting a bullet with a bullet. And we Keep. On. Freaking. Doing. Just. That. Patience, Philip --- these are rocket scientists you're talking about.

As I previously noted, critics like Coyle are simply dishonest:

[T]he critics that in one breath say that our enemies are too inept to even get an ICBM to our shores also say in the very next breath that these same enemies have the technological prowess to cap their primitive rockets with the most advanced countermeasures in the world. It doesn't add up, and vividly illustrates the mendacity of missile defense critics. They'll whack at missile defense with any club available even if their arguments laughably contradict each other.

The big question NPR ends with is "what will happen in the next administration?" Who knows.

In conclusion, it was pretty good series overall, especially for folks unfamiliar with what we in the missile defense field do for a living.

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NPR Series & McKittrick's Analysis

• Series Overview
• Part One:  The Threat (my take)
• Part Two:  Ground-Based Defense (my take)
• Part Three:  Sea-Based Defense (my take)
• Part Four: European Bases & Russian Response (my take)
• Part Five: Political Future (my take)

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(Originally posted at Perfunction; original comment threads are over there)

NPR On Missile Defense: Part 4 -- European Bases & Russia's Response

In Part 4 of its series today (audio here), National Public Radio covers the geopolitical impact of our planned ballistic missile defense (BMD) bases in the territories of Warsaw Pact NATO allies, Poland and the Czech Republic.

Already suspicious of the expansion of American influence into all of its former Eastern European satellites --- and even some of its former Soviet republics in Central Asia --- Russia is freaking out:

The commander of strategic missile forces, Gen. Nikolai Solovtsov, said Russia could direct nuclear missiles against strategic targets in Poland.

Poland has signed a deal with the US to build and host 10 missile interceptors.

Russian officials have repeatedly voiced anger at the move, which they see as an effort to surround Russia.

"I cannot exclude that if such decisions are taken by our top military-political leadership, the missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic and other such objects could be chosen as designated targets for some of our inter-continental ballistic missiles," Gen Solovtsov said.

If threatening to nuke it off the map didn't prompt the Poles to kowtow, then how about an outright punitive invasion of an upstart former republic? Instead of terrorizing it back into its loving arms, Russia sent a foot-dragging Poland sprinting for NATO. Oops:

Then Russia invaded Georgia, and almost immediately, the Polish government signaled its willingness to sign up. In early September, Poland's Prime Minister Donald Tusk hosted Secretary of State Rice in Warsaw.

And when oh-so-persuasive sabre-rattling like that doesn't work, Putin's former-KGB apparatchiks resort to more familiar tactics, turning their sights from the Poles to the Czechs:

PRAGUE (Reuters) - Russian spies are extremely active in the Czech Republic and are stirring public sentiment against a planned U.S. missile defense base, the Czech counter-intelligence agency said on Thursday.

...

"The intelligence services of the Russian Federation have attempted in the past year to contact, infiltrate and influence people and organizations that have influence on public opinion," the BIS report said.

"Russian espionage activities in the Czech Republic currently reach an exceptionally high intensity."

Who are Putin's agent provocateurs provoking? These hunger-striking weenies. Way to go, comrades. In the meantime, the US House just approved full funding of the Czech radar yesterday.

While Russia irrationally throws a fit over a purely defensive system aimed at one of the most recalcitrant terrorist regimes in the world, the US is left scratching its head:

Lt. Gen. Henry Obering, the director of the Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency, expresses frustration that the Russians won't see that the system is focused on Tehran.

"Having 10 interceptors in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic does not change the strategic balance," Obering says. "I mean Russia has hundreds of ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles], thousands of warheads, and there's no way that these interceptors threaten that."

Obering's point in perspective (source):

As I pointed out with the handy map accompanying this review of the superior intellect of Keith Olbermann, our Eastern European BMD sites were chosen to specifically --- and exclusively --- confront the Middle Eastern (i.e. Iranian) threat. Will the Russians ever realize that?

===================

NPR Series & McKittrick's Analysis

• Series Overview
• Part One:  The Threat (my take)
• Part Two:  Ground-Based Defense (my take)
• Part Three:  Sea-Based Defense (my take)
• Part Four: European Bases & Russian Response (my take)
• Part Five: Political Future (my take)

================================================================

(Originally posted at Perfunction; original comment threads are over there)

NPR On Missile Defense: Part 3 -- Aegis Sea-Based Interceptors

National Public Radio focuses it's attention on the remarkably successful sea-based element of our ballistic missile defense (BMD) today (audio here). The reporter mainly repurposes his previous report from the USS Lake Erie from a few months ago, but it's still pretty good.

Heck, even the naysayers cannot deny the success of the Aegis platform:

Even sharp critics of the Missile Defense Agency, like Philip Coyle of the Center for Defense Information, acknowledge that sea-based missile defenses do show some promise.

"The Navy has had a greater success rate in terms of successes where they've done flight intercept tests," Coyle says. "They've had a greater success rate than the big ground-based system has had."

While Aegis' achievements are notable, the platform's short range makes it unsuitable for most of the trajectory of long-range ICBM's. And you can't exactly drag these things up on shore. But in a hairy situation, a picket of ships near the launch point and likely target(s) could be extremely valuable, and their global maritime mobility is also a big plus. The US currently has over a dozen BMD-certified Aegis cruisers and destroyers at sea, including a notable namesake.

Ground-based interceptors (GBI's) are still required to address the longest, highest part of the threat trajectory, the mid-course phase.

===================

NPR Series & McKittrick's Analysis

• Series Overview
• Part One:  The Threat (my take)
• Part Two:  Ground-Based Defense (my take)
• Part Three:  Sea-Based Defense (my take)
• Part Four: European Bases & Russian Response (my take)
• Part Five: Political Future (my take)

================================================================

(Originally posted at Perfunction; original comment threads are over there)

NPR On Missile Defense: Part 2 -- Ground-Based Interceptors

Yesterday, National Public Radio gave us Part One of its week-long series on US missile defense. Today in Part Two (audio here), they report on two of the most controversial aspects of our ballistic missile defense system (BMDS):

• Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI's), and
• Threat Countermeasures

GBI's are silo-housed interceptors that are designed to intercept ICBM's outside the atmosphere. Like all of our interceptors, GBI's do not have an explosive warhead. Rather, the GBI lofts an Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV), a self-maneuvering slug that smashes the ICBM's re-entry vehicle (RV) into a million pieces through brute kinetic force.

Currently deployed at Fort Greely, Alaska (pic above) and Vandenberg AFB, California, GBI's have had a low profile as the sea-based Aegis BMD system has racked up several high profile test intercepts (including that real world toxic spy satellite shootdown).

Indeed, beyond today's NPR report, the most recent news about Ground-Based Interceptors (besides this successful GBI intercept) was this April 2007 ABC profile of the largest GBI base in the world, Fort Greely, Alaska. Terry Moran's Nightline television crew was the first and only to film inside the base:

But GBI's have finally been thrust into the limelight as we start deploying them in Poland ... on the doorstep of a belligerent Russia.

And this is where truly uninformed folks start throwing really, really dumb rocks. Celebrated rocket scientist Keith Olbermann expertly analyzes our Polish BMD strategy:

Olbermann spouts the standard knee-jerk criticism of missile defense --- we don't even need it because no enemy has the technology and range to reach us or our European allies. His dim invocation of a North Korean launch against Poland is not even worth debating; North Korea threatens our Asian allies --- and now --- the West Coast. While able to engage threats from the Middle East as well, Greely and Vandenberg are primarily tasked with defending against Asian threats.

On the other hand, Iran has been making strides in its missile development and may have the ability to reach the edges of Europe today. Our Polish deployment of GBI's is designed to counter not only an intermediate-range threat to Europe today, but more importantly, any longer range threat to the US itself in the future. US-bound Iranian ICBM's must follow an over-Europe trajectory to reach the East Coast, Keith:

This corridor over Europe is not the Iranian's choice. Blame Newton.

So, while sharp-as-a-marble Olbermann parrots the easy talking point, NPR and ABC inject the next standard gripe: enemy countermeasures can easily defeat our BMD interceptors.

I will grant them that point.

However, the critics that in one breath say that our enemies are too inept to even get an ICBM to our shores also say in the very next breath that these same enemies have the technological prowess to cap their primitive rockets with the most advanced countermeasures in the world. It doesn't add up, and vividly illustrates the mendacity of missile defense critics. They'll whack at missile defense with any club available even if their arguments laughably contradict each other.

We are fielding interceptors to deal with the immediate and near-term threats out there. As I wrote yesterday, we are NOT trying to counter a blizzard of Russian missiles that do indeed have sophisticated countermeasures and MIRV's, but a handful of basic ICBM's from a handful of enemies.

And as far as dealing with future countermeasures from these rogue states --- we're working on it:

I remind you, we had ZERO fielded missile defense seven years ago. So rest assured we'll make significant progress against countermeasures in the next seven years.

UPDATE: Thanks, Dave in Texas at AOSHQ.

===================

NPR Series & McKittrick's Analysis

• Series Overview
• Part One:  The Threat (my take)
• Part Two:  Ground-Based Defense (my take)
• Part Three:  Sea-Based Defense (my take)
• Part Four: European Bases & Russian Response (my take)
• Part Five: Political Future (my take)

================================================================

(Originally posted at Perfunction; original comment threads are over there)

NPR On Missile Defense: Part 1 -- Intro

Today, National Public Radio begins a five part series on what they deem "one of the most important yet least examined issues of the Bush administration."

The series synopsis looks pretty interesting, though the standard cast of critics will make their requisite appearances. I especially like this insightful critique from Part One (audio here) on the ballistic missile threat we face:

[Richard] Garwin testified before a congressional panel earlier this year that the threat of attack with nuclear weapons is real, but not delivered by intercontinental ballistic missiles.

"A state wishing to deliver nuclear weapons to injure the United States homeland would far more likely use short range missiles or cruise missiles launched from a ship to attack U.S. coastal cities with nuclear weapons than use an ICBM for that purpose," Garwin says.

NEWSFLASH, Dick: Our ballistic missile defense system (BMDS) is a layered system that is designed to engage ALL types of ballistic missiles in ALL phases of flight, not just ICBMs.

And the "far more likely" scenario Garwin describes, a short range nuke launched from a ship to attack a coastal city? We just successfully ran that scenario this past June; an Aegis cruiser shot down a Scud launched from a decommissioned amphibious assault ship.

Hopefully the NPR series will dispel much of the ignorance about our BMD system and strategy. Many folks still think we're trying to develop Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative:

• We are NOT attempting to shoot down a thousand-missile swarm of Soviet ICBMs; we ARE shooting at a handful of rogue missiles.
• We are NOT using space-based ray guns, particle cannons, disruptors, lasers, blasters or phasors; we ARE using space-based sensor satellites to detect that handful of rogue missiles.
• We are NOT shooting nukes at nukes; we ARE using sheer kinetic trauma to obliterate a missile with a warhead-free interceptor. Think two refrigerators slamming into each other at 15,000 mph.

It's a different world, a different threat, a different strategy, and a different technology.

Regardless of the knee-jerk criticism you are sure to hear, it sounds like a pretty good radio series this week.

===================

NPR Series & McKittrick's Analysis

• Series Overview
• Part One:  The Threat (my take)
• Part Two:  Ground-Based Defense (my take)
• Part Three:  Sea-Based Defense (my take)
• Part Four: European Bases & Russian Response (my take)
• Part Five: Political Future (my take)

================================================================

(Originally posted at Perfunction; original comment threads are over there)